INTRODUCTION
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The Labour Government which took office in 1997 inherited levels of poverty and inequality unprecedented in post-war history. More than one in four UK children lived in relative poverty, compared to one in eight when Labour had left office in 1979 (DWP, 2004) . Poverty among pensioners stood at 21%. 1 Income inequality had widened sharply: in 1979 the post-tax income of the top tenth of the income distribution was about five times that of the bottom tenth;
by the mid-1990s that ratio had doubled (Hills, 2004, Table 2 .5).
In opposition, the new government had been careful to avoid major commitments to addressing social and economic disadvantage. In practice, it has implemented a broad and ambitious social policy programme, taking on a wide-range of social ills, including child poverty, worklessness, area and neighbourhood deprivation, and inequalities in health and educational attainment. How much has this programme achieved? Shortly after the election, one of New Labour's prominent strategists had challenged "the doubters" to "judge us after ten years of success in office. For one of the fruits of that success will be that Britain has become a more equal society" (Peter Mandelson (1997, p.7) . There is some time to go before this particular deadline, but as Labour nears the end of its second term in office this is still a good time to take stock. This book aims to assess the impact of government policies since 1997 on poverty, inequality and social exclusion. Is Britain indeed becoming a more equal society than it was when Labour was elected? benefited the richest most and the poorest least. Indeed, on one measure, the incomes of the very poorest were lower in real terms in 1994/5 than they had been in 1979 (Hills, 2004, . After a sharp fall during the late 1980s boom, male unemployment peaked at nearly 14% in 1993, before another period of growth brought it back down towards 1979 levels: 8% in 1997 was relatively low in international terms. However, the allocation of jobs across households had changed, with growing polarisation between households with two earners and those with no member in work. By 1997 more than 16% of households were workless, more than twice the 1979 level (Gregg et al., 1999) .
[ Figure 1 .3 about here]
In part these developments can be attributed to global changes which led to falling demand for unskilled labour and increasing premiums for skills and qualifications. These pressures affected many countries, but the UK was hit harder than most. Long-term factors, such as the high proportion of the workforce with low qualifications, arguably made the UK particularly vulnerable, but government policy under Margaret Thatcher exacerbated the effects. Curbs on trade union powers, an end to the minimum wage protection provided through the wages councils, the move to linking benefits to price levels rather than to incomes, and changes to tax policy which shifted the burden from those with high to those with low incomes all played a significant part.
Certainly the UK's relative performance on poverty and inequality deteriorated sharply during this period. Figure 1 .4 shows the change in the Gini coefficient between the start of the 1980s and the mid-1990s for the UK and ten other industrialised countries with available data. While the most equal countries saw slight increases in inequality over this period, the biggest changes took place in Australia, the USA and -most strikingly -the UK. By the mid-1990s the Gini was higher in the UK than in any other country represented except the USA.
[ Figure This was a tough legacy for a party traditionally concerned with the poor and dispossessed. In addition, the incoming government faced public services which had suffered from two decades of declining investment, a process which had begun with the visit of the IMF in 1976 and continued under Thatcher and into the 1990s. Overall public expenditure changed little as a share of GDP during the late 1970s and 1980s. But net public sector investment fell from an annual average of 5. 9% of GDP between 1963 and 1976 to an average 3.1% between 1976 and 1980 and 1.3% between 1985 and 1995 (HM Treasury, 2000 . Relative public sector pay had also fallen significantly, with nurses, teachers and manual workers hardest hit: a young male teacher would have been ranked in the 72 nd percentile position in the late 1970s (i.e., he would have earned more than 71% of the population), but only 63 rd between 1995 and 1999; a young female manual worker (e.g. a hospital ward assistant) fell from the 55 th to the 39 th percentile over the same period. (Nickell and Quintini, 2002 ). This meant low morale, staff shortages and high rates of staff turnover in some of the most important areas of the public sector.
Surveys of public opinion at around the time Labour took office showed strong support for tackling many of these trends. In 1995 87% of those interviewed for the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) agreed that 'the gap between those with high incomes and those with low incomes [in Britain] is too large'; up from 72% in 1983 and high by international standards (Spencer, 1996) .
Similarly, 71% of those interviewed in 1994 agreed that there was 'quite a lot'
of 'real poverty' in Britain, up from 55% in 1986 (Hills, 2002) . And 73% of respondents in 1998 thought it 'definitely' or 'probably' government's responsibility to reduce the income differences between rich and poor.
When it comes to considering how the government might do this, opinion is more divided. The British Election Survey finds slow decline to 1992 in those agreeing that 'income and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary working people' (54% in the mid-1970s down to 47% in 1992), followed by a sharp increase to 60% in 1997 (Heath et al., 2001 , Table 2 .9). The BSA shows falling support throughout the 1990s for the statement that 'government should spend more on welfare benefits for the poor', although in 1997 more people (40%) still agreed than disagreed (Hills, 2002 , Figure 1 ). But there is overwhelming support for the extension of public services, including health, education and welfare, even if this would mean higher taxes -72% in favour in 1997, compared to 7% who would have cut taxes even at the expense of reducing services. In 1979 both options had received 34% support (Heath et al., 2001 , Table 3 .8).
Would the new government be able to harness public opinion to bring about real change?
THE GOVERNMENT'S STRATEGY
A radical dawn?
The initial euphoria which greeted Labour's election victory on May 2 1997 masked the fact that most people had had low expectations for the new government -fewer than three-quarters of the electorate had turned out to vote, for instance. The wave of excitement that swept the country may have been explained by a general expectation of change; it was unlikely to have been driven by any clear new strategy or specific pledges made by the Labour Party in opposition. In an interview shortly before the election, Tony Blair claimed he was going to be 'a lot more radical in government than many people think' (The Observer, 27 April 1997), underlining the cautious promises with which the party had approached the election.
Given Labour's recent electoral history their approach was understandable. As early as 1985, Neil Kinnock had argued that 'the harsh electoral reality' was that Labour could not rely 'merely on a combination of the dispossessed, the "traditional" and increasingly fragmented working class and minority groups for the winning of power', but needed to broaden its appeal (quoted in Heath et al., 2001, p.101 ). Kinnock initiated a major policy review which led to the party abandoning many of the policies believed to have cost it votes in 1983, including commitments to unilateral nuclear disarmament, to the extension of public ownership, to restoring trade union collective bargaining rights, and to withdrawal from the European Community (Seyd, 1998) . These changes brought modest electoral benefits: Labour's share of the vote rose four points to 35% in 1992 -still less than it had achieved in 1979 after the winter of discontent (Heath et al., 2001 ).
In the aftermath of the 1992 election defeat the need to reposition the party grew in urgency. Many shared Giles Radice's view that social and economic trends were gradually eroding Labour's traditional core support in the trade unions, on council estates and among manual workers (Radice, 1992) . When Tony Blair took over the leadership on John Smith's death in 1994 he made it clear that he intended the party to 'build a new coalition of support, based on a broad national appeal that transcends traditional electoral divisions' (Blair, 1994, p.7) . The new target voters were to be those in 'middle income, middle Britain'; the strategy to appeal to those with economic and social aspirations, not just to the poor and disadvantaged (see Seyd, 1998; Heath et al., 2001) .
From the start, Tony Blair continually emphasised the idea that he was leading a new and different party. In his speech to the 1995 Labour Party Conference, he used the word 'new' fifty-nine times, sixteen of them with reference to 'New Labour' (Seyd, 1998) .
The 1992 defeat left Labour with a particular concern -almost an obsessionabout the issue of tax. As Blair's strategy adviser, Philip Gould, put it in 1998:
'We were certain that we had lost elections in the past partly because of tax, and we were determined not to let it happen again this time' (quoted in Heath et al., 2001, p.44) . As shadow chancellor, John Smith had proposed the restoration of a 50% tax rate on incomes over £40,000 and the extension of national insurance contributions on incomes over £22,000. An analysis of poll data had found no evidence that these proposals had cost Labour the 1992 election (Heath et al., 1994) , but after four successive defeats the Labour Party were not willing to take risks. In January 1997 Gordon Brown made a public commitment to stick to the Conservatives' spending plans for the first two years of a new Parliament, and not to raise either the basic or top rates of income tax. This pledge seems to have registered with the public: for the first time, 1997 saw roughly as many people (31%) place themselves to the left of Labour on taxes and spending as to the right (34%) (Heath et al., 2001 , Table   6 .4). In 1992 19% had put themselves to Labour's left, against 57% to the right.
The commitment on spending was not simply about getting elected. Heath et al. (2001) argue that Labour had failed in the past due to a lack of realism and effectiveness in managing the economy, and that the modernizers accepted this. Though never appearing high on the agenda, Blair's rhetoric prior to the election had made reference to the dispossessed. In January 1996 he had proclaimed that 'for the new Millennium we need a war on exclusion and a determination to extend opportunity to all' (Levitas, 2000) . In July of the same year he wrote in the Independent on Sunday: 'If the next Labour Government has not raised the living standards of the poorest by the end of its time in office, it will have failed' (Blair, 1996) . But under some definitions, the living standards of the poorest had risen slightly even under Thatcher, so this could hardly have been more modest an ambition. However, as Labour Minister Margaret Hodge would put it in 2000, 'in the latter days of Opposition, few
Labour politicians chose to promote equality for fear of losing electoral support' (Hodge, 2000, p.34) . 'Have faith' was Blair's message to his critics on the left (Blair, 1996) . It was impossible to know whether goals would become more ambitious once Labour was safely in office.
New Labour in Office
In Unit, denouncing the 'scourge and waste of social exclusion' as 'the greatest social crisis of our times' (Mandelson, 1997) . Social exclusion would never receive a clear definition, but it was clear from the series of attempts to define it that the government's concern was with multiple deprivation. At the SEU launch in December Blair described it as '... about income but … about more.
It is about prospects and networks and life-chances. It's a very modern problem, and one that is more harmful to the individual, more damaging to self-esteem, more corrosive for society as a whole, more likely to be passed down from generation to generation, than material poverty' (quoted in The SEU was seen as important precisely because of the interrelations between these different problems: it would 'improve understanding of the key characteristics of social exclusion' and co-ordinate policy across departments and with local authority and voluntary organisations, to provide 'joined-up government for joined-up problems'.
While those who had called for action to tackle deprivation were pleasedperhaps relieved -that this was clearly a New Labour priority after all, there was concern that talking about social exclusion was a way of disguising the fact that nothing was being done about income inequality and material poverty. Fairclough (2000) points out that Blair's first definition above moves seamlessly from defining social exclusion as about 'more than income' to a formulation in which exclusion is contrasted with material poverty -i.e., it is not about income at all. Similarly, Levitas (1998) notes that (in the passage that begins this chapter) Mandelson speaks of achieving a more equal society through many routes, 'not just the redistribution of cash from rich to poor' (her emphasis), but that he goes on to make it clear that these other routespromoting employment and improving educational standards -must take priority (see Mandelson, 1997, p.8) . The announcement of the SEU's programme for the first six months made it clear that income poverty was not part of its brief: the first areas to be looked at were school exclusions, rough sleeping, and poor areas; to be followed by teenage pregnancy and 16-18 year olds not in education, training or employment. In the week of the 1997 Labour Party Conference, fifty-four professors of social policy and sociology wrote to the Financial Times welcoming the establishment of the SEU but expressing concern that its agenda did not include the adequacy of benefit levels. They argued that, by ignoring the need for income redistribution, the government was trying 'to tackle social exclusion with one hand tied behind its back' (Lister and Moore, 1997) .
However, the fact that redistribution was not part of the SEU's brief did not necessarily mean that material poverty was being ignored. The Treasury kept firm control of tax-benefit policy from the start, and the SEU agenda is consistent with a strict division of labour between the two bodies. One of Gordon Brown's first priorities at the Treasury was a welfare-to-work programme. As had been promised in the manifesto, the first Labour budget in July 1997 announced that the windfall levy on privatised utilities -the only major source of additional funds available during the first two years in officewould be used to fund a New Deal for Young People, with some of the money set aside for a New Deal for Lone Parents. Alongside programmes helping the workless into jobs, Brown was also keen to ensure that paid work made financial sense: on the day after the election, he told the Treasury to start developing plans for a tax credit scheme for the working poor (The Guardian, 'Our historic aim will be for ours to be the first generation to end child poverty.
It is a 20-year mission, but I believe it can be done' (Blair, 1999 Despite the gentle overtures of the 1998 and 1999 budgets, it is widely agreed that Blair's Beveridge speech marked a sea-change in both the government's language and its policy approach (Lister, 2001; Deacon, 2003) . There is less consensus about where this change appeared from, and why it happened when it did (see Deacon, 2003) . One theory is that, with the two-year commitment to the Conservative spending plans coming to an end, the government was now able to declare openly the goals it had had all along. Alternatively, the announcement may have been a reaction to the rebellion over lone parent benefit cuts.
Both factors are likely to have played a part, but a third element was almost certainly the growing recognition of the extent to which opportunities available to adults are diminished by the experience of poverty in childhood. In a pamphlet on the Third Way in 1998 Blair had declared the four values 'essential to a just society' to be 'equal worth, opportunity for all, responsibility and community' (Blair, 1998, p.3) , and since then opportunity were listed as lack of opportunities to work, lack of opportunities to acquire education and skills, childhood deprivation, disrupted families, barriers to older people living active, fulfilling and healthy lives, inequalities in health, poor housing, poor neighbourhoods, fear of crime, and disadvantage or discrimination on grounds of age, ethnicity, gender or disability (DSS, 1999, p.2). The report promised 'an integrated and radical policy response' to these combined problems (DSS, 1999, p.23) , and emphasised the importance of long-term solutions, and of flexible action geared to local needs.
Tackling childhood deprivation lay at the heart of the strategy outlined, with three essential policy areas highlighted: education, including pre-school education; policies to tackle family worklessness and poverty through changes to the tax-benefit system and improvements to childcare provision; and policies supporting young people in the transition between childhood and adulthood, including increasing participation and learning by 16-18 year olds, improving outcomes for children leaving care, and action on teenage pregnancy.
The second theme was employment. In language by now familiar, the report asserted that 'worklessness is the main cause of poverty and social exclusion'
(DSS, 1999, p.78); 'work for those who can' (DSS, 1999, p.7) is therefore key to the solution. Again, the response was to be multi-pronged, taking in welfare-to-work programmes, changes to incentives to make work pay, policies to promote 'lifelong learning' to improve skills, and action on health inequalities.
Employment was also a central part of the strategy for combating poverty among future generations of pensioners. For current pensioners, OFA highlighted increases to benefit income and action to eradiate fuel poverty, as well as action on health, housing, transport and crime; all aimed at improving opportunities for pensioners to live 'secure, fulfilling and active lives'. for the first time, calling for a Britain 'in which we continue to redistribute power, wealth and opportunity to the many not the few' (Blair, 2002 Cooper appeared to set new boundaries in announcing that 'if we are to achieve social justice in the next generation, we have to tackle inequality as well as exclusion', but she went on to make it clear that her concern lay with inequalities in life chances not outcomes (Cooper, 2004) .
ASSESSING THE IMPACT
OFA and the child poverty pledge laid the groundwork for what has become a wide-ranging and ambitious set of policies. This book aims to assess the overall impact these policies have had to date on the situation of groups and individuals living in poverty or at risk of exclusion when the government came to power. Before going any further, however, it may be helpful to clarify the terms under which our assessment will be made. Are we assessing the government's success in meeting their own objectives, or in meeting an alternative set of objectives that we believe they ought to have had? And if the latter, is it reasonable to be judging progress towards goals that the government Assessing the government's success in meeting its own objectives could therefore be a relatively straightforward task, with a lot of the work already done, although the tricky question of whether the targets set were sufficiently ambitious remains. A more fundamental question is whether we accept the government's objectives; that is, whether we accept their understanding of the key elements of poverty and social exclusion. An overview of alternative discourses on social exclusion is helpful here.
Concepts of poverty and social exclusion
Perhaps the most useful place to start is with Levitas (1998) , who identifies three different approaches to social exclusion used in contemporary political debate, each with its own implications for policy solutions. The first, which
Levitas labels the redistributionist discourse (RED), sees social exclusion as a consequence of poverty: it is income that the excluded lack, so raising benefit levels would be one effective policy response. The second, the social integrationist discourse (SID), sees inclusion primarily in terms of labour market attachment. The excluded are those who are workless, leading to a focus on policies which encourage and enable people to enter paid work. The third approach is labelled by Levitas as the moral underclass discourse (MUD) and places responsibility for social exclusion on the 'moral and behavioural delinquency' of the excluded themselves.
Levitas argues that 'Labour understands social inclusion primarily in terms of participation in paid work' (p.128); it is an understanding based heavily in SID.
(She also suggests that certain policies, such as benefit cuts for lone parents, have undertones of MUD, but there is little hard evidence of any genuine belief in a moral underclass.) As we have seen, employment takes centre stage in OFA alongside tackling childhood deprivation, and Labour's rhetoric has consistently emphasised employment as the route out of poverty and exclusion.
However, the simplification that the Levitas position inevitably represents is unfair to Labour in 2004. While early language and policy suggested welfareto-work programmes would be the main plank of Labour's social policy, subsequent developments have resulted in a much richer set of policies than would have been predicted in 1998, as discussed above. There is much in OFA -and there has been extensive policy action -concerning non-employment barriers to participation, including poor health, poor housing, high levels of crime and poor neighbourhoods.
Still, this leaves the question of whether Labour's approach has any foundations in RED. On the one hand, while the language of redistribution has clearly been downplayed, there has been considerable 'redistribution by stealth' to non-workers, and not just to families with children but also to pensioners and to some disabled claimants. 'Security for those who cannot' may have received less attention than many would like but it has not been ignored altogether.
On the other hand it can be argued, first, that the interpretation of 'unable to work' has been narrow: there has been little sympathy for workless adults without children who are not registered disabled. Working-age adults without children tend to be overlooked in poverty assessments: poverty among all working-age households is tracked in OFA, but this includes (and hence figures are strongly affected by) households with children.
Second, where redistribution has taken place it has been clearly -and often explicitly -limited to improving the situation of those at the bottom relative to the middle, with the position of those at the top considered irrelevant. Equality has been redefined as equality of opportunity, with a sense that this can be achieved without tackling income inequality overall. This is a convenient position for New Labour, as Margaret Hodge acknowledged in 2000:
'[Equality of opportunity] allows us to position ourselves as promoting both individual ambition and prosperity, whilst still tackling inequality. That appeals to middle Britain' (Hodge, 2000, p.35) . But does it make sense? Is it possible to 'create equality through public services' (Hodge, 2000, p.39) against a background of huge inequalities in income and accumulated wealth, which allow many people to opt out of those services? As Lister (2001) argues, 'equality of opportunity in the context of economic and social structures that remain profoundly unequal is likely to remain a contradiction in terms'.
A working definition developed by Burchardt, Le Grand and Piachaud (BLP) provides a second perspective on social exclusion (Burchardt et al., 2002) .
Synthesising a number of previous formulations, BLP define social exclusion in terms of non-participation in key activities. For the UK in the 1990s they identify four dimensions: consumption (the capacity to purchase goods and services); production (participation in economically or socially valuable activities); political engagement (involvement in local or national decisionmaking); and social interaction (integration with family, friends and community). Participation in every dimension is regarded as necessary for social inclusion.
The first two of the BLP dimensions can be seen as rooted in RED and SID respectively, although the type of productive activity that brings about social integration is understood more widely here than elsewhere, going beyond the paid labour market to include, for instance, caring activities and volunteering.
But the third and fourth dimensions broaden the concept to include ways of participating that are often overlooked. In particular, this conceptualisation highlights the importance of empowerment -of having a voice in decisions that affect one's life. This is not a concept which features explicitly in the government's understanding of social exclusion. Neither political nor social participation is mentioned in OFA as important in its own right; 'partnership' is promoted but because it is likely to result in more successful programmes -'real progress can only be achieved by working together' (DSS, 1999, p.3) . The last chapter in Part III, Chapter 14, provides an international perspective:
Kitty Stewart looks at how levels of poverty and inequality in the UK now compare to those in other industrialised countries, and at the factors underlying remaining differences.
In Chapter 15, we pull together the threads of the book with the aim of reaching an overall assessment of the government's record. Does the evidence of the previous chapters add up to a substantial assault on the levels of poverty, inequality and social exclusion inherited in 1997? As this becomes the first Labour government in history to complete a full second term in office, how much of a difference can it be said to have made?
Finally, a word on devolution. One of the most significant reforms of Labour's first term was constitutional, with separate assemblies and greater powers over a number of areas of domestic policy for Scotland and Wales. With the Northern Ireland experience included, this means three or four variants across the UK for many of the policies discussed in this book. In some cases, this means little more than different names and details for policies moving largely in the same direction, but in other cases the differences are of more substance.
The book is unable to do full justice to the wide variety of experience, and discussion is often confined to the situation in England, but chapters aim to draw attention to the most significant policy differences, where these vary, particularly where these appear to have led to differences in outcomes.
